Heidegger's Being Towards Death & Critique by Sidney Hook (Philosophy)

Philosophy of Death

In Martin Heidegger’s existential philosophy, Being-toward-death is not merely about approaching the clinical end of one’s life but represents a fundamental mode of existence. It reflects a process of personal growth and self-realization where dread of death plays a pivotal role. This dread, or Angst, is essential for achieving an authentic perspective on life.

Heidegger critiques the conventional understanding of time as a linear progression of past, present, and future. Instead, he proposes a more nuanced view of temporality that includes three interrelated modes: time, the present, and the notion of the “eternal.” For Heidegger, time is not a straightforward sequence but an ecstasy, involving a dynamic interplay of past, present, and future. This perspective emphasizes how futurity — our projections into the future and our place within our historical context — shapes our understanding of existence. Human beings are defined by their ongoing projects and future possibilities, which absorb and direct their lives. Death is described by Heidegger as the absolute impossibility of Dasein (the individual’s existence), distinct from other types of endings or shortages. Unlike empirical events, death is not something that can be experienced in a typical sense; it is deeply personal, non-relational, and unavoidable. Dasein’s death is unique to each individual: it cannot be experienced by another, nor can it be understood through the deaths of others. This inevitability of death, however, is never fully known or predictable — it is always a part of one’s existence, as soon as life begins, one is already in a position to die. Heidegger highlights that the conventional discourse on death often obscures its true nature. The “they-self,” representing societal norms and attitudes, treats death as a distant or abstract event rather than an immediate, personal reality. This leads to a devaluation of death, reducing it to a mundane aspect of life that lacks authentic significance. In contrast, authentic Being-toward-death requires Dasein to confront its individuality and finitude. This confrontation involves stepping out of the “they-self” and reevaluating one’s life from the perspective of its ultimate end. The encounter with death brings about Angst, a form of existential anxiety that is not directed at specific objects but at the self in its entirety. Angst reveals Dasein’s sense of estrangement or “uncanniness” in the world. It is through this realization that Dasein can hear the “call of conscience,” which urges it to be true to itself and embrace its own authentic existence. In this state of authenticity, Dasein becomes open to “unconcealment” (aletheia), understanding both what is hidden and the nature of hiddenness itself. Heidegger’s philosophy thus integrates the opposites of truth and untruth, illustrating how existential anxiety and the confrontation with death can lead to deeper insights into the nature of being and existence. Thus, angst can lead to a freedom about existence, but only if people can stop denying their mortality, which he expressed in his terminology as stop denying being-for-death.

The American philosopher Sidney Hook criticized Heidegger’s view of death anxiety in his review of Heidegger’s book Being and Time when it was translated into English in 1962. Hook noted that for Heidegger, death anxiety is a primordial anxiety, not something that waxes and wanes with changes in nature, history, or society, and the anxiety is about the possibility that one’s existence may at any moment become finally impossible. Hook argued that Heidegger’s claims were wrong.

“Now even when we become aware of this possibility, there is no evidence that we normally become anxious about it, unless the possibility is concretized and seems probable. Nor does Heidegger advance any reasons why we should be anxious. After all, because we cannot imagine ourselves dead, this hardly justifies the inference that our existence is necessary. What we know about human attitudes towards death indicates that Heidegger’s generalization is false. Some men, and not only figures like Socrates and Spinoza, have no anxiety in the face of death. Men have believed that there are many things which could happen to them that are far worse than death. Any sensitive person can think of a variety of circumstances that would make death a happy release, almost a privilege.”

Hook’s critique highlights a significant counterpoint to Heidegger’s assertion that death anxiety is a universal and constant aspect of human existence. He suggests that the anxiety surrounding death is not as pervasive or inevitable as Heidegger posits, and that for many, other life circumstances may evoke more immediate and intense fear or dread than the abstract notion of mortality. Moreover, Hook emphasizes that human attitudes toward death are diverse and influenced by various factors, including personal beliefs, experiences, and cultural contexts. For some, death may be seen as a natural and acceptable part of life, or even as a welcome end to suffering. This perspective aligns with historical and philosophical figures who approached death with equanimity or saw it as a transition rather than an endpoint.